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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
HEBER \V. GLENN, 
Pla.inti ff and A ppella;nt, 
-vs.-
GIBBONS & REED COMPANY, a 
corporation, 
Defendant and ReszJondent. 
Case No. 7952 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEl\ll~NT OF F ACTR 
The appellant is also the plaintiff and the respond-
ent i:-; the defendant, and hereafter, the parties will be 
referred to as plaintiff and defendant. 
Defendant does not·feel that plaintiff has fully stated 
the facts, nor e1nphasized those that are controlling. 
Therefore, as briefly as possible and without undue repe-
tion we shall atte1npt to point out to the court those facts 
which seen1 to us to be determinative and decisive in this 
case. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
Defendant is the owner of the property upon which 
the slide occurred drunaging plaintiff's shovel. It is situ-
ated in South Dav1s County, east of the road leading to 
Val Verda whe-re the cutoff takes place frmn Beck Street 
going north, and consists of n1ountainous country used 
for many years for gravel pit operations (R. 26, 27, 408). 
Although the property was under lease to Gordon T. 
Hyde, operating as the White Hill Sand & Gravel Com-
pany, the defendant as the owner had reserved the right 
to come upon its own property and take the gravel from 
it (R. 31). The defendant for n1any years has owned and 
operated many other gravel pits in this and other areas 
(R. 408). 
Defendant testified that there is no standard pro-
cedure in operating gravel pits. There are many wayi', 
but not any particular one is standard. It all depends on 
how you want to handle the gravel after you get it out. 
It can be extracted with a dragline, dozed down with a 
dozer, pushed over a trap, loaded with a shovel, loaded 
with a dragline, loaded with a back hoe, or loaded with 
an elevating grader, or pushed on to a belt conveyor. 
There is nothing unusual about using a shovel to exca-
ya te a gravel pit. "That is probably the major reason 
that a shovel was developed." To take 1naterial out of a 
mountain. It b; not adapted to digging holes or to earr~·­
ing dirt long distances. It wa~ originated to operate par-
ticularly in gravel and sand pits and one of the most com-
mon methods of operating a gravel pit is hy means of a 
shovel (R. 409-410). 
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On July 19, 1951, the defendant started to renwve 
gravel from its pit involved in this case. Fron1 then until 
August 16, it had excavated frmn the mountain with its 
own shovel and without blasting 24,211 yards of earth. 
Frmn August 16, until October 13, 1951, 49,175 yards of 
additional gravel was taken from its pit by the defendant 
so that defendant took from the pit 73,386 yards. On Oc-
tober 8, one Yic K ewman began working in the pit with 
his shovel and he n1oved 6, 784 yards of gravel. He loaded 
this into defendant's trucks for lOc a yard. He had a 
shovel of his own and so far as the defendant knew he 
was using his own shovel. Newman was an independent 
contractor hired by l\Ir. Reed, one of the defendant's 
officers, and worked under the supervision of the de-
fendant's foreman ~I r. Keith, neither of whom knew of 
any interest of the plaintiff in the shovel used by New-
man. All Kewman was hired to do was pick up the gravel 
with his shovel and load it into defendant's trucks; his 
man operated the shovel and all the defendant did was 
to furnish the trucks and Newman loaded then1. He could 
go any place he cared to as long as he got the material 
the defendant could use for its customer (R. 406, 407, 362, 
363). 
The defendant had an order to furnish material to 
be used as fill for the Phillips Petroleum Company and 
indicated at the beginning of its operations that probably 
about 20,000 yards would be needed. Defendant started 
in at the base of the hill, which had not been theretofore 
worked, and proceeded with a shovel to work from south 
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end of the property to the north in a sort of half circle 
from the base of the hill and on into the undisturbed 
mountain (R. 30, 31, and 349, 350). The record contains 
a good deal of testimony about who originally handled 
the gravel and whose shovel did the original shoveling 
and so forth, which is irnmaterial to the points involved 
in this appeal, and we shall, therefore, not detail such 
evidence. The record is also full of staternents and esti-
rnates as to the height of the vertical bank created by the 
shovel and blasting operations in excavating the gravel 
on defendant's land. The testinrony of the man who was 
actually doing the blasting was that on October 13, the 
highest point from the ground level to the top of the cliff 
was smne 65 feet and about lj2 of this or :3:2lj~ feet \Ya~ 
undisturbed and loose rnaterial sloping away from the 
face, 80 that the so-called vertical cliff was about 3:2~ i 
feet; then came the sloping material which extended out 
about 32 feet at an angle of 45° (R. 327). The defend-
ant's foren1an testified to the same thing and also that :20 
feet in height from the bottom of this sloping material 
was solid dirt that had never been disturbed, topped h~· 
an additional ten feet of slough (R. 359, 360). It also ap-
pears that what is referred to hy appellant as the vertical 
wall is not vertical at all, and never was vertical and was 
never steeper than a one to one slope. The face was never 
perpendicular (R. 352, 353). 
As defendant proceeded with the securing of material 
it became necessar~· eventually to ns<:> some rl~·namite 
to blast in the uwuntain in order that there would he 
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loose Inaterial slough off to be picked up later by the 
shovels. Defendant at first used its own shovel and as 
heretofore indicated later engaged N ew1nan with his 
shovel to continue the loading of the trucks. 
Blasting begun, H8 above indicated, on August 16, was 
done after hours by e1nployees of Mr. Hyde (White Hill 
Sand & Gravel), who were paid for this work by defend-
ant. Defendant's fore1nan states that the blasting was al-
ways done after 4:30 in the afternoon. Son1e days they 
would not blast at all because there would be enough 
loose Inateria~ (R. 355). Between about September 15 
and October 13, very little material was moved fr01n 
the pit by defendant. In that period White Hill Sand 
& Gravel loaded about 4,000 yards, and Newman loaded 
about 6,000, so that in the last month before the slide only 
about 10,000 yards were moved- from the pit (R. 413). 
As we have already indicated, up to August 16, 2-±,-
000 yards were moved; in the last month 10,000, so that 
between August 16, and the middle of September, more 
than half of all the material was moved from the pit. 
Mr. Dastrup who was the Superintendent of White 
Hill Sand & Gravel, and an experienced powder man, 
and who had been doing the blasting for the defendant 
( R. 115, et. seq.), testified that on October 13, which was 
Saturday, the day before the slide, they used 32 sticks 
of dynamite, just one shot, and felt that as a result there 
would be plent~· of Inaterial in the morning for the shovel 
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to scoop up and load into the trucks (R. 121). However, 
sometime during the night the entire 1nountain broke 
loose several hundred yards back from the place where 
the excavating and blasting was being done and moved 
from the southeast to the northwest, covered up the shovel 
being used by Newman, which we learned after the slide 
was owned by the plaintiff, covered some of the sheds 
of the White Hill Sand & Gravel and a good deal of the 
White Hill Sand & Gravel equipment, which was located 
up on the mountain far distant from the excavating oper-
ations. Mr. Hyde estimated probably half to three-
quarters of a million yards of material n10ved in the slide 
(R. 68, 69). 
Although no witness knew or testified to what caused 
this terrific slide, Dr. Cook, a witness for the plaintiff 
purported to advance a theory based upon hypothetical 
assumptions not present in the case. He assumed that 
there was a straight up and down cliff, a distance of 80 
to 100 feet on a solid clay base, saturated with water, 
loosened by terrific blasting, so that the mountain slid 
out like a pea in a pod on the clay base. However, an ex-
amination of his testimony demonstrates that it is of 
very little value in this case. First, there is no evidence 
of a vertical cliff 80 to 100 feet high. There is no evi-
dence of a clay base, nor is there any evidence of water 
saturation. Dr. Cook admitted that he didn't know the 
extent of the clay, but it looked like it would be about 
six or eight feet, but he didn't know how far back it went 
(R. 219). It sloped downward from west to east so that 
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the Inountain would have to go up hill to nwve on the clay 
(R. :220) : that in order to state that the clay was an iin-
portant factor in the slide, he would have to know more 
about it. He sun11narized his own evidence as follows: 
··Q. In order to consider the clay was an iinport-
ant factor in the Lreak, wouldn't you have to 
know how extensive it was? Where it was, 
sOinething about it J? 
A. Actually you would and I mn expressing thi.; 
1nerely as a theory. I agree. I don't know 
what exactly caused this break. I say that the 
evidence that is there I would suspect, as a 
result of the evidence there, that there was a 
clay bed underneath this burden. We see a 
clay bed. Now that is in about the right posi-
tion for it to have caused this particular diffi-
culty. And I will tell you one other thing that 
~~ou know beyond any question-
Q. X o"·, wait a minute, before we leave this. 
You don't know where the clay bed is except 
where you saw it in this one spot out there~ 
A. \\~ell you see in its position with respect to the 
re~t of the burden that it was near the bottOin 
of the break. It was near the bottom of the 
material. 
Q. I ~ay, you don't know how extensive it is, Dr. 
Cook~ 
A. That's correct. You can't see into the face. 
Q. So you can't tell without knowing the extent 
of the clay bed whether it was a factor or 
not~ 
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A. That's right. You need to know all of those 
details to know that. 
Q. That's right. You need to know that. And 
you don't know that~ 
~-\.. That's right. I only suspect that that was the 
situation." (R. 233). 
Although he also stated that the explosives were a 
factor at page 225, he then said the following in contra-
diction: 
"A. No, indeed. I don't believe that the explosives 
had anything to do with the break practically, 
only a slight amount. It doesn't have a direct, 
it wasn't the direct cause of the break." 
Yery little material was moved in blasting "some-
times there would be a ton or so at other times several 
tons cmne down." This is the testimony of the man who 
actually did the blasting (R. 313, 134). 
It also appears from the record, not only that there 
was no solid clay base, but that it was not saturated with 
water. The clay only appeared occasionally, and the 
water only appeared once in a while. No witness testified 
that there was a saturated clay base. The defendant':-; 
foreman, ~r r. Keith, testified that earlier in the work 
water was encountered, but as they proceeded back into 
the 1nountain it disappeared (R. 362). Neither ~rr. Gib-
bons nor :\I r. Reed had seen water and :\I r. Gibbons had 
seen no clay (R. -!12, 418). 
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~[r. Hansen, the original shovel operator for the 
defendant on this project, objected to working on the 
project when blasting operations began. He estimated 
that he had moved out a:bout 50,000 yards of earth with 
the Gibbons and Reed shovel, and that at that time, th~ 
pit was not a great deal bigger than it was when 20,000 
yards had been n1oved out. He objected to working any 
longer because the operation was dangerous to the shovel 
operator (R. 180). There was always a slope at the 
bottom and at the top and it was never straight up and 
down. The blasting occurred intermittently only over a 
period of about a rnonth (R. 183). 
There are many staternents in the record about the 
danger of this operation, but that danger was only to the 
men working under the cliff from sloughing or from fall-
ing rocks. :Jir. Hyde obviously didn't think that the op-
eration was dangerous to hirn. He did not move his own 
rnachinery and equipment and it was covered over. He 
stated that while he didn't go in under the cliff because 
of the personal danger he didn't anticipate that anything 
would happen such as did happen. He didn't expect a 
slide to cover up his equipment. He didn't expect it at all. 
The danger that he was afraid of was to the person oper-
ating under the cliff. He never expected any slide of the 
character that occurred (R. 81, 82, 83). He felt that when 
they were blasting that was dangerous to anyone near the 
blasting (R. 88). 1-Ie had no objection to his own super-
intendent and other employees working at the blasting as 
long a~ they were doing it on their own time (R. 92). 
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~fr. C. \Y. Spence, a witness for plaintiff and a for-
mer state inspector stated that he couldn't expect the 
whole 1nountain to move; the blasting nlight be danger-
ous for men who were near it, but you don't expect the 
whole mountain to 1nove (R. 161). 
Defendant's foreman, Mr. Keith, testified that on the 
13th of October, 1951, he saw nothing different than on 
previous days (R. 359); that there was nothing to indi-
cate that such a slide would occur, or that there was dan-
ger of such sliding (R. 373); that there was just a little 
water pocket in the formation at the northwest ::-ide; 
he only saw water a time or two (R. 385); that he would 
have done this operation just as he did had he known 
from the beginning that there was going to he taken out 
of the pit the amount that was taken out. He realized 
that there would be a little danger fron1 the sloughing 
and to the powder men who were up digging the hole, 
"but he didn't know there was going to be anything like a 
slide like that." ( R. 394). 
On October 13, 1951 the plaintiff came out to the 
gravel pit looking for his shovel. He had loaned it to 
Newman who is a contractor in Salt Lake Cit~T' with 
whom he trades work frequently, and he had done so prior 
to this time. Newman works for himself and when ht> 
took the shovel he told plaintiff he was going to work at 
the \Yhite Hill Sand & Gravel Company with which op-
t>ra tion the plaintiff was fmniliar. Plaintiff did not know 
how he intended to use the shovel and made no pffort to 
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find out. Xewn1an said he would use the shovel for about 
three days and later trade work with plaintiff for that 
three days work. On October 13, \vhen the plaintiff went 
out to the gravel pit looking for his shovel; about 3 :00 
o'clock in the afternoon he found Perry, who was New-
nlan' s man, running the shovel between the sheds of the 
"~hite Hill Sand & Gravel and the bank. He was loading 
dirt within 20 feet of the bank. 
"Q. And what did you do~ 
A. I called the 1nan off the shovel and told hin1 
to get it out of there and do it fast. 
Q. And did he~ 
A. X o, he did not. 
Q. Did you stay there until he got it out~ 
A. :K o sir. I did not. 
Q. Did you make any other effort to get it out~ 
A. I didn't have time. 
Q. Did you make any effort that day to get it 
out~ 
A. I tried to find Vic Newman or some of Gib-
bons and Reed's men, and I could not find 
them. I drove down to the petroleum company 
and tried to find somebody down there that 
knew something about it and as it happened 
I missed them. They had just left there and 
that was all the effort that I tried to get it 
out. * * * 
Q. And it wa~ dangerous, looked dangerous to 
you \vhere he was working~ 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
A. Absolutely dangerous. 
Q. And so you went off and left your equip-
ment in this dangerous condition~ 
A. I didn't have any, I had on my good clothes, 
my car was in danger. I didn't want to leave 
my car there. 
Q. Well I just asked you, Mr. Glenn, you went 
off and left your shovel there~ 
A. That's right. 
Q. Left your shovel in that dangerous place? 
A. That is it. I guess I did it. 
Q. And did nothing more about it that day? 
A. That's right." (R. 290, 291, 299, 301, 302). 
:\Ir. Keith was at the pit and ~f r. Perry remained 
there until 4:30 trying to get the shovel to work. On this 
night the shovel wouldn't go forward, but it would go 
ba·ckwards, and Perry parked it 100 to 150 feet from the 
face of the cliff (R. 128, 129). It appeared to be in a safe 
place (R. 127). 
:Jlr. Glenn, the plaintiff, knew how to run the shovel 
and could have moved it away himself had he so desired. 
He did not rent the shovel to Gibbons & Reed. He rented 
it to Vic Newman who stated he would use it for about 
three days and when Glenn went out for it, Newman had 
had it about two weeks. The plaintiff is a contractor 
8pecializing in roads and excavating, and has been in that 
business for 35 years ( R. 289, 307). 
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'Ye had nothing to do with detennining where the 
shovel would be left. The shovel opera tor would back it 
up to what he thought was a safe distance (R. 135). 
PRELI~IINARY STATEMENT 
Defendant does not believe that the plaintiff has 
correctly approached the problmn involved here. The de-
fendant does not feel that its negligence or lack of negli-
gence is an issue, nor does it feel that in this case it had 
any burden of proving or establishing the contributor~~ 
negligence of the plaintiff. We shall, therefore, present 
the proble1n to the court under the following headings : 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. IN THE OPERATION OF ITS OWN PROP-
ERTY, WAS THE DEFENDANT UNDER ANY DUTY TO 
ACCOUNT TO THE PLAINTIFF FOR THE METHOD USED. 
POINT II. THERE IS NO ACTIONABLE NEGLI-
GENCE OF THE DEFENDANT IN THIS CASE. 
POINT III. PLAINTIFF'S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-
GENCE AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF WITH RESPECT TO 
IT. 
POINT IV. A CONSIDERATION OF PLAINTIFF'S 
POSITION AND BRIEF. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. IN THE OPERATION OF ITS OWN PROP-
ERTY, WAS THE DEFENDANT UNDER ANY DUTY TO 
ACCOUNT TO THE PLAINTIFF FOR THE METHOD USED. 
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The defendant is the owner of the property upon 
which the plaintiff's shovel was being used. Defendant 
had no contract, express or implied, with the plaintiff 
for the use of his shovel. It did have an agreement 
with Newman whereby it paid him for shoveling the sand 
and gravel into its trucks for a specified price. 
Newman was an independent contractor engaged to 
do certain work on the defendant's property for a consid-
eration. He furnished his own equipment. So far as the 
defendant knew the shovel belonged to Newman. It had 
no relationship whatsoever with the plaintiff. X ewman 
and the plaintiff had an agreement of benefit to both 
whereby plaintiff loaned his shovel to Newman, in return 
for the future use of Newman's shovel by the plaintiff. 
Defendant had no part in this transaction, nor did it 
know of it. Newman used the shovel as he saw fit. De-
fendant had no control over its use or operation, nor did 
it e·xercise any control over it, nor did it tell Newman 
where he should leave the shovel at the conclusion of the 
day's 'vork. Newman was either a mere licensee or a very 
limited invitee. If he was a licensee, that is, "a person 
who enters upon the property of another for his own eon-
venience, pleasure or benefit," then we owed him no 
duty 
"* * * except not to harm him wilfullY or 
wantonly, or to set traps for him, or to expose. him 
to danger reeklessl~· or wantonlv." 38 A 111. ,/11 r. 
765,par. 104. · 
If he was an Invitee: 
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"There i~ no liability for injuries fro1n dan-
gers that are obvious, reasonably apparent, or as 
well known to the person injured as they are to 
the owner or occupant." 38 Am. J ztr., 757, 758, par. 
97. 
N ew1nan was hired to do the very thing complained 
about by the plaintiff. X ewman not only knew the condi-
tions present, but \Hl~ actively engaged for compensa-
tion in assisting in the creation of the alleged dangerous 
condition. 
As to the plaintiff: 
Defendant never invited the plaintiff to place his 
shovel on its property nor did it give him a license to do 
so. Had the plaintiff himself been present with his 
shovel, he would have been a trespasser. 
The conditions surrounding the work were open and 
obviou::; and no witness, nor anyone else, had any reason 
to believe that the operations 'being conducted upon the 
land would cause the tremendous slide that occurred. 
K or is there any evidence that the operations did cause 
a slide. No one knows what caused it. It is an unexplain-
ed catastrophe. 
Plaintiff complains that the defendant was not oper-
ating the pit in the nonnal way. The owners of the pit 
are experienced men and they and their foreman stated 
that the~, were operating it in the only practical way, 
which wa~ also normal and usual, in order to extract 
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the limited amount of gravel required by the defendant. 
Defendant was the one to detennine how its pit should 
be worked. 
It is ele1nentary that 
''An action to recover dan1ages for an injury 
sustained by the plaintiff on the theory that they 
were caused by the negligence of the defendant 
will not lie unless it appears that there existed, 
at the time and place where the injury was in-
flicted, a duty on the part of the defendant and a 
corresponding right in the plaintiff for the protec-
tion of the latter." 38 Am. Jur., par. 12, page 652. 
So far as the defendant knew Newman was using 
his own shovel. The actual fact is that he was using the 
shovel at a place the plaintiff knew about, where he had 
a right to use it with the plaintiff's consent. The defend-
ant owed to the plaintiff no greater duty than it did to 
Newman. It had no relationship whatsoever, express or 
implied, with the plaintiff. It did not request the plain-
tiff to loan Newman his shovel; it did not request New-
man to use the plaintiff's shovel; the plaintiff had no 
right to have his shovel on the defendant's property ex-
cept through Newman. 
''In other words, there can be no actionable 
negligence where there is no act or service or con-
tract which a party is bound to perfonn or fulfil. 
While the existence of a duty to use due care may 
be predicated merely upon a relation between the 
parties, and while its extent depends in the last 
analysis upon the circumstances of the particular 
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case, it is of necessity a real duty in every case 
of negligence, not to he supplied by proof of mere 
usuage or custom, and the care which must he ob-
served in its performance is measured by a defi-
nite standard." 38 Am. Jur., par. 12, pages 654, 
655. 
The evidence 1n this case is undisputed that de-
fendant was operating its property as it had a right to 
operate it. All of the conditions known to the defendant 
were as open and obvious to Newman, plain tiff or any-
one else as they were to the defendant. The defendant 
had no control over the shovel or where it was left and 
never attempted to exercise any control of any kind 
over it. It owed no duty to Newman or the plaintiff and 
"It is essential to liability for negligence, then, 
that the parties shall have sustained a relationship 
recognized by law as the foundation of a duty 
of care; some relationship must exist between the 
one inflicting the injury and the person injured, 
by which the fonner owes some duty to the la~ter.'' 
38 Am. Jur., par. 1-±, page 656. 
Cases of highway accidents, automobile collisions and 
the like are not in point here because here the injury 
arose on defendant's own property, to one on the prop-
erty for his own profit and under conditions which he 
himself was assisting in creating and which were as open 
and obvious to hin1 as they were to anyone else. Neither 
plaintiff nor anyone else had the right to tell the defend-
ant how it should operate its property. 
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The evidence without conflict shows : 
1. That in the operation of our own property we 
owed no duty of any kind to the plaintiff; we never re-
quested the plaintiff to bring his shovel on our property 
and never even knew that it was his shovel. 
2. That the plaintiff never at any time had any 
right to tell us how we should operate our pit; we had the 
right to operate as in our judgment best suited our pur-
poses. 
3. The plaintiff made his own arrangements with 
Newman for Newman to use his shovel and these ar-
rangements were for the benefit both of Newman and 
the plaintiff. Newman for his own and plaintiff's profit 
brought the shovel as his own on our property. Newman 
himself was a part of the operation and his own acts 
aided in the creation of any alleged danger, and all of the 
circmnstances, the method of shoveling, the blasting, the 
loading, and actual condition of the ground, its condi-
tion as the work progressed, were as open, obvious and 
apparent to plaintiff and Newman as they were to us. 
4. We had no knowledge, express or implied, of 
any dangerous trap, latent or concealed perils, or of any 
other facts which would lead us or any other reasonable 
person to assume that the thing that actually occurred 
would occur as a result of our operations. 
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POINT II. THERE IS NO ACTIONABLE NEGLI-
GENCE OF THE DEFENDANT IN THIS CASE. 
None of plaintiff'~ authorities on foreseeability, 
proxin1ate cause, or negligence are of assistance in the 
solution of the proble1n presented by this case. No wit-
ness anticipated that our operations would result in the 
tremendous slide that occurred, nor did any witness testi-
fy fron1 facts that our operations did cause the slide. 
The cause of the slide is unknown and unexplained. 
It is a thing that has never occurred before or since in 
this area, nor was there anything that warned or should 
have warned anyone that such a cataclysm would occur. 
The foreseeability rule applies to the things that 
hmnan foresight can and should anticipate. Before we 
can discuss particular injuries it must have been reason-
ably foreseeable that the cause of the injuries could be 
anticipated. The rule is well stated in 38 Am. Jur., par. 
61, page 712, as follows: 
"In accordance with the general test of proxi-
mate cause above set forth, the law does not charge 
a person with all the possible consequences of his 
negligent act. He is not responsible for a conse-
quence which is merely possible, according to occa-
sional experience, but only for a consequence 
which is probable, according to ordinary and usual 
experience." 
In the case at bar it was not even possible according 
to occasional experience for anyone to forsee such a slide 
because one had never occurred in any of defendant's 
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gravel pits or anywhere else in this area, nor is there 
any evidence that we could have anticipated any such 
slide as a result of usual and ordinary experiences. Con-
tinuing the quotation, the author says: 
"It has been said that the natural and prob-
able consequences are those which hmnan fore-
sight can anticipate because they happen so fre-
quently that they may be expected to happen 
again, and that the possible consequences are 
those which happen so infrequently that they are 
not expected to happen again. Negligence carries 
with it liability for consequences which, in the 
light of attendant circu1nstances, could reasonable 
have been anticipated by a prudent man, but not 
for casualties which, although possible, were 
wholly improbable." 
Also the same author, 38 Am. Jur., par. ~-+, pag-r GG~, 
has the following to say: 
"Generally speaking, no one is bound to guard 
against or take 1neasures to avert that which, un-
der the circumstances, a reasonably prudent per-
son would not anticipate as likely to happen. Mis-
chief which could by no reasonable possibility 
have been foreseen, and which no reasonable per-
son would have anticipated, cannot be taken into 
account as a basis upon :wh1ch to predicate a 
wrong. Negligence Inust be determined upon the 
facts as they appeared at the time, and not 
h)· a judgment from actual consequences which 
were not then to be apprehended by a prudent and 
competent man. * * * If n1en were held answer-
able for everything they did which was dangerous 
in fact, they would be held for all their acts from 
which harm in fact ensued." 
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The last sentence applies particularly 1n the case at 
bar. It is true that the very nature of the operation itself 
carried with it certain dangers. As Spence, a witness 
for the plaintiff, said: Every gravel pit is inherently 
dangerous, graYel sloughs off all the time, it never stops 
sloughing, regardless of the height of the bank (R. 152). 
But the danger is to the 1nen operating and blasting who 
were right against the 1naterial being loosened. The 
danger to be apprehended to them according to all the 
witnesses was only from the sliding or sloughing of the 
rocks, material and boulders in the imn1ediate operation. 
The court in the trial of the case expressed this thought 
in opposition to the plaintiff's continuous repetition, 
when he said : 
"The Court: Yes, it would be dangerous to 
hirn in a shovel, or the man standing at the base, 
but that isn't the issue here. These people aren't 
charged with having endangered this man's life or 
the man that put in the dynamite; they are charged 
here with operating in such a manner that caused 
this slide that caused this trouble * * * except in-
sofar as it relates to the slide that happened that 
covered the shovel, I don't see how it is rnaterial, 
unless you can connect it up in that manner" (R. 
181, 182). 
Again the author at 38 Am. J'ur., par. 23, page 665, 
has the following to say: 
"Fundamentally, the duty of a person to use 
care and his lia:bility for negligence depend upon 
the tendency of his acts under the circumstances 
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as thev are known or should be known to him. 
The fo~dation of liability for negligence is knowl-
edge-or what is deemed in law to be the same 
thing : opportunity by the experience of reason-
able diligence to acquire knowledge-of the peril 
which subsequently results in injury." 
Also, 
"On the other hand, an injury is not action-
able if it was not foreseen, or could not have been 
foreseen or reasonably anticipated." 38 Am. Jur., 
par. 23, page 666. 
This court is committed, of course, to the same uni-
versal doctrine as we have been discussing. In Bogden 
v. Los Angeles & S. L. R. Co., 59 U. 505, 205 P. 571, thi1s 
court states at page 578 of the Pacific Reports, par. 7 
and8, 
"While the accident was an unfortunate one, 
yet it was one which the defendant could not have 
foreseen, and therefore cannot legally be held 
liable for. In the conduct of modern 'business 
enterprises, accidents will, and of necessity, must 
happen. The law, however, does not impose lia-
bility unless the party charged with negligence 
could by the exercise of reasonable care and dili-
gence have prevented the accident." 
There is no evidence in this case that we knew or 
reasonably could have known, because what happened 
had never happened before, that our operations would 
result in a slide of the entire mountain. Nor is there an~· 
evidence that our operation was the cause of the slide. 
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\Ye took tlw gravel out with a ~hovel and hy blasting-, 
which wa:s eu:ston1ary. The only way that we could have 
avoided the accident wa~ not to use our property and not 
to take out the gravel. Of course, plaintiff argues that 
terracing the pit or taking the gravel off the top would 
have avoided the accident, but we tried to terrace it with-
out succe:s:s and there wa~ no top from \vhich to take the 
gravel, because the 1nountain was untouched when we 
started the operation. The argun1ent is rnade that we 
:'hould have foreseen that operating the way we did would 
loosen up the entire mountain; the thing we could not 
have anticipated; it has never happened before or since 
in any of our operations or of any other operations in 
this area. No plaintiff's argument narrows to this in 
result: That "·e couldn't take out gravel from oltr land 
and use our own knowledge and experience as to the 
proper way to take out the gravel in the limited mnount 
we needed. \Y e know of no rule of law that would in1pose 
~uch a restriction on us nor has the plaintiff cited any. 
The plaintiff, himself, did not anticipate or foresee that 
our operation would cause this tremendous 'slide. Any 
danger that he did foresee was as open and obvious to 
him a~ it was to us. 
\\r e, therefore, respectfully sub1nit that the plaintiff 
has ~hown no action for neglig-ence again~t the defendant. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
24 
POINT III. PLAINTIFF'S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-
GENCE AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF WITH RESPECT TO 
IT. 
As we have shown, the evidence of the plaintiff hun-
self establishes that on Saturday, October 13, the day be-
fore the slide, at 3 :00 o'clock in the afternoon, the plain-
tiff personally came to our property seeking his shovel. 
When New1nan called him and asked for the use of the 
shovel he told the plain tiff he was going to use it at the 
White Hill Sand & Gravel Cmnpany, and the plaintiff 
consented. The plaintiff was familiar with the operation8 
out there, but he made no effort to find out how the shovel 
was to be used (R. 291, 300). His testimony is the only 
testimony in the case "·ith reference to his conduct. He i~ 
a contractor with 35 years experience in roads and ex-
cavating. Newman wanted to use the shovel for three 
days and he had already had it two weeks on October 13. 
\Vhen plaintiff got to the gravel pit he couldn't find New-
Inan so "\Vhen I drove up I called to the operator, the 
man on the shovel and told hin1 to get it out of the pit. 
that the pit was dangerous and I didn't want the shovel 
there." The operator was using the shovel at the time 
plaintiff was out there. He had it between the ~lwd~ 
and the bank and he "·a~ within 20 feet of the hank. Plain-
tiff told the man to get the shovel out, and he made no 
further effort to get it out except to drivP up to the petro-
leum plant to try to find X ewman or some of (; ibhons & 
Reed'~ men. He thought that Perry (the operator) would 
walk it out. hut lw didn't ~tn:· to see that he did. He knew 
how to operatP the shovel. lmt he had hi~ g·ood elothe~ on 
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and hi~ car wa~ 1n danger and he didn ,t want to leave 
hi~ car, and ~o he just went off and left the shovel in that 
dangerous place and did nothing more about it (R. 302, 
307). 
The plaintiff testified that the place was absolutely 
dangerous. He, nevertheless, didn't 1nove his own shovel, 
which of course, he had a right to do. He knew how to 
move it, but he had his good clothes on and he didn't want 
to leave his car in danger. So frmn his testimony the 
danger was Yery inuninent, so 1nuch so that he couldn't 
take the tinw to nwve his shovel because to do so would 
be to leave his car in danger. He then went and left his 
shovel and did nothing further about it. 
The slide did not occur until some 1-1 hours later. 
The opera tor was using the shovel and, of course, the 
plaintiff would know that he would continue to use it, 
hut he voluntarily elected to leave it there for what he 
:::a~-s were three reasons: 
1. The operator said that he would have to get 
order3 from X ewman. Of course, that is not true be-
cause the plaintiff owned the shovel; he knew how to op-
erate it and could have 1noved it himself. Also he imme-
diately shows that that was not the reason because he 
;-;ays he expected the 1nan to walk it out. 
•) He didn't 1nove it himself because he had on 
his good clothes. 
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3. He didn't move it hin1self because his car \Ya;:; 
in danger. Obviously his car was in no more danger than 
the shovel and yet he took no further action with refer-
ence to the shovel when there were 1-! hours during which 
he could have done anything necessary to get the shovel 
away. Obviously the plaintiff did not regard the condi-
tions there as so dangerous as to require him to take the 
shovel out. He, not we, assmned that the shovel would he 
backed out. We had nothing whatever to do with where 
the shovel was left; had no control over it, no connec-
tion with it. So the uncontradicted evidence shows that 
the plaintiff with full knowledge of all the circmnstances 
left his shovel and went his way. He either did not regard 
the situation as dangerous to the shovel or else he volun-
tarily left it in a position of danger for his own con-
venience. 
None of the defendant's officers or emplo~·ee~ shared 
the plaintiff's apprehensions, so that he now finds him-
self in a position from which he is trying to extricate 
hi1nself. That there can be no recovery by the plaintiff 
under such circumstances is well established. 
Referring again to 38 Am. Jur., par. 171, page 8-Hi, 
we find the following, which is particularly applicable 
in this case : 
''Thus, a person upon the property of an-
other, who deliberately chooses to expose himself 
to danger of a patent character in the condition of 
the premi~e~, which he could Pa~ilv avoid with the 
exerci:-:P of care may not hold the iandowner liabl(• 
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for any resulting injuries, whatever may be the 
nature of his relationship to the landowner." 
This is the doctrine of asstunption of risk. Also, 
as to contributory negligence: 
"X o rule of the comnwn law has been accepted 
rnore readily or more widely than the general rule 
that the contributory negligence of the plaintiff 
constitutes a defense for a defendant charged with 
negligence." 38 Am. Jur., par. 174, page 848. 
This court has long been cornn1itted to the doctrine 
that a plaintiff \\·ho subjects himself or property to ob-
Yious risks to avoid inconvenience to himself cannot re-
cover a:3 a matter of law. 
Whalen v. Union Pacific Coal Co., 55 U. 445, 168 P. 
99. In that case the court cited Shearman & Redfield On 
.. Yegligence with approval as follows: 
"But the plaintiff will be chargeable with con-
tributory negligence if he runs the risk of an ob-
vious and serious danger merely to avoid incon-
venience." 
In the case of Bogden v. Los Angeles & S. L. R. Co. 
59 U. 505, 205 P. 571 heretofore cited on another point, 
this court said on the que'stion of contributory negligence 
that the defendant did not even need to plead contribu-
tory negligence, and that without an affirmative plea 
it could take advantage of the evidence produced by the 
plaintiff: 
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"That a defendant 1nay rely upon plaintiff's 
evidence in that regard and may move for a non-
suit or for a directed verdict upon plaintiff's own 
evidence showing contributory negligence, and 
that he may request the court to charge upon 
that question upon such evidence, is fully con-
sidered and determined in favor of the proposi-
tion by this court.", (citing cases). 
In that case the defendant did not even plead contribu-
tory negligence and presented no issue with respect to 
it. 
In Kttchennwister c:3. Los Angeles & S. L. R. Co .. 
52 U. 116, 172 P. 725, at page 729 of the Pacific Reports, 
this court distinguishes between assumption of ri'Sk and 
contributory negligence, holding that the former implies 
an intelligent choice, \\~hereas contributory negligence 
does not necessaril~T require inteHigent choice on the 
part of the plaintiff. Both assun1ption of risk and con-
tributory negligence appear in the case at bar to preYent 
the plaintiff from recovery. 
The fact that the jur~· found no contributory negli-
gence i~ not controlling. Not only do the Rules of CiYil 
Procedure protect the defendant from unauthorized jury 
verdicts hy permitting the court to giYe judgments not-
withstanding the verdict, hut this court even prior to 
the rules "·a~ committed to that doctrine. 
In the case of O'Brin1 z·s. Alston. Gl l'. :~G~, :21:: 
P. 791, the question wa~ argued that the jury had fore-
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closed the que~tion of contributory negligence and 
purged the plaintiff of the san1e. In that case as well 
as in the case at bar the contributory negligence 
appeared frmn the plaintiff's own evidence and this 
court :'aid at page 793 of the Pacific Reports : 
··It is contended in the case at bar, however, 
that the jury passed upon this question, and have 
purged the plain tiff and her son of negligence. 
'Vhere, as here, plaintiff's own evidence discloses 
that the acts and conduct of her son, for which 
:-'he is responsible, were the proximate cause of 
the injury and damage complained of, neither 
court nor jury has a legal right to absolve her 
fron1 the consequences of such conduct. To do 
that would be to permit one to recover damages 
which he himself has caused or could have pre-
vented hy the exercise of ordinary care and a 
compliance with the existing law. To permit a 
recovery under such circumstances amounts to 
the taking of property wrongfully from one 
person and giving it to another. That, the law 
doe·s not tolerate, and no court or jury can rise 
above the law." 
In the case at bar, the plaintiff could have walked 
his own machine out of the pit had he so desired. He, 
not the defendant, thought the shovel was in danger, 
~'et he did nothing about it. He left it. The shovel could 
have been backed out, even though there was something 
wrong \vith it that would not permit it to go forward 
(R. 1:2~). 
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In the case of Taylor vs. Bamberger Electric R. Co., 
62 e. 552, 220 P. 695, plaintiff chose to ride on the steps 
of an open railroad car rather than at a safe place inside 
because of sn10ke and heat in the interior of the car. 
Several interesting questions were discussed by this 
court that are present in the case at bar. There the 
plaintiff's negligence appeared frmn his own testimony. 
The court instructed the jury that the burden of proving 
contributory negligence was upon the defendant. This 
was error. In the case at bar the trial court did the same 
thing (R. 428, 429), and it may well be that one of th-e 
reasons for granting our motion for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict was that the trial court realized 
that it should not so have charged the jury because that 
burden here was not ours. The evidence here is that of 
the plaintiff, himself, and is without conflict. As a 
n1atter of law, it bars the plaintiff frmn recovery. In 
the Bamberger case, supra, the court said (p. 701 P.): 
"The ordinary and natural meaning of the 
language used h~· the court (that it was defend-
ant's burden of proving contributory negligence) 
to the minds of ordinary laymen would therefore 
be to the effect that, the defendant having failed 
to produce an~· affirmative evidence upon the 
issue of plaintiff's contributory negligence, there-
fore that issue should be found in favor of plain-
tiff. I!! view of plaintiff's statements respecting 
his acts and conduct, which, under the circum-
stances, were certainly inexcusable, the jury must 
lwn' construed and applied the language of the 
instruetion a~ we have indicated, or they could 
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not haYe arrived at the conclusion that plaintiff 
was not guilty of contributor·y negligence as that 
tern1 was defined by the district court." 
Under the circumstances it was held that this 
in~truction \Yas erroneous. It was also held that the 
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a rnat-
ter of law; that the evidence was uncontradicted and 
came frmn him, and, therefore, was not for the jury's 
determination. 
The Bamberger case has been cited in other juris-
dictions and wa::; announced hy our court because of 
similar holdings in other states. In the case of Denham 
Theatre, Iuc., r:3. Beeler (19-tl, Colo.) 109 P. 2d G-±3, the 
Supreme Court of Colorado cited the Bamberger case 
and held that where the plaintiff's own evidence dis-
closes his negligence there is no burden of proof resting 
upon the defendant, and that to instruct the jury that 
the defendant has the burden of proof under such eir-
crnnstances is error. 
··\Vhere it may legitimately be inferred frmn 
plaintiff's own evidence that she was contrib-
utorily negligent, there is no burden of proof 
resting upon defendant." (p. 655 #4.) 
The proximate cause of the plaintiff's InJury was 
leaving the ~hoYel in a place of danger. \Ve did not 
leave the shovel in a place of danger, we did not even 
plaee it in a place of danger. Plaintiff left his shovel in 
a place of danger according to his own evidence. Under 
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such circmnstances his own conduct 1s the proximate 
cause of his dmnage. In Olson vs. De1zrer & R. G. W. R. 
Co., 98 U. 208, 98 P. 2d, 9-1-!, this court held that 
although the defendant created the condition, it was the 
plaintiff's own act in running into the defendant's train 
which was the proxi1nate cause of the accident. 
The plaintiff voluntarily left his shovel in a position 
which he and he alone says was one of absolute danger. 
It is not our duty to back his shovel out. That duty was 
his if he felt it was in danger. Actually he could not 
have believed it to be in danger or he wouldn't have left 
it there. His excuse that he had on his good suit, etc., 
is the real reason and he cannot e'scape the consequences 
of his own act Inerely because it was inconvenient for 
hiin to act. The truth of the rna tter is that he didn't 
think the shovel was in any particular danger and if 
he didn't think so he can't charge us ·with any further 
knowledge than he had. Plaintiff is in1paled upon either 
or both horns of his dilennna, assmnption of risk or 
contributory ngeligence. 
POINT IV. A CONSIDERATION OF PLAINTIFF'S 
POSITION AND BRIEF. 
It will readily appear from an examination of the 
record that the plaintiff has only partially and incom-
pletely stated the undisputed facts as they appear from 
the record. On pages 3 and G and 33 and :~-+ of his Brief, 
plaintiff I i:-;t:~ 1 :~ points which: 
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1. Do not establish any duty that we owe him, 
Are not ac<>nrate, 
3. Do not exonerate plaintiff from his correspond-
ing duty eYen if there had been a duty owed hin1 by us. 
He ::'tate~ in hi:3 first three propositions that the 
graYel pit was operated with a Yertical bank extending 
from GO to 100 feet in height resting on a wet clay base, 
and that water ran down, through and along the clay 
washing therefrom the fine n1aterial holding the coarse 
graYel fonnation intact. Bearing in n1ind that we were 
operating our own gravel pit on our own property, the 
pl?.intiff has no right to c01nplain about the Inethod of 
operation unless we owed hin1 a duty. However, no-
where does it appear that there was a vertical bank 
60 to 100 feet in height. All the testimony is to the 
effect that there wa~ a solid slope and loose material 
at least half way up the bank, the solid material had 
never been touched and the loose material ·was that 
which had ~loughed off in the course of operations, so, 
although only one witness, ~rr. Hyde, ever stated that 
the bank was 100 feet in height which obviously was 
erroneous fr01n the testimony of all the other witnesses, 
that would only establish that the 'so-called vertical bank 
was 50 feet and that bank was never vertical, but always 
~loped back. There is no evidence that there was a wet 
(•lay hase. \Yater was found only intermittently, as also 
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was the clay, nor did the water run down through the 
gravel washing it out; the evidence is that the water 
was never running and such water as there was was 
intermittent. 
We have already com1nented on the value of Dr. 
Cook's evidence. He was the only one who purported 
to give a theory of this tre1nendous slide, and on cross-
examination he conceded that he didn't know what caused 
it; that his theory was based upon facts given to him 
which he conceded were not borne out by the evidence. 
Point 4 by the plaintiff is that \Ye used dynamite. 
There is nothing in the evidence that the defendant 
violated any proper procedure in this respect. 
In Point 5 plaintiff states that the operation was 
not in compliance with the orders of the Industrial Com-
Inission. This court will search the record in vain for 
any such evidence. Not only are the so-called regulation:-; 
of the Industrial C01nmission too vague and indefinite 
to establish a duty, but .Mr. Spence the former ~al't·t~· 
official of the state completely failed to point out an~· 
violation of these vague regulations on our part. 
Point 6 is c01npletely untrue that the pit wa:-; not 
operated in the normal and usual manner. It is true 
~I r. Hyde stated that he didn't operate the pit that 
\\'a~,, but "·e are not bound to follow :Jl r. Hyde or his 
views, and the very fact that ~~ r. Hyde himself left his 
own machinen· and equipment where it wa:-; damaged 
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hy the cataclysm that occurred is conclusive proof that 
.Jlr. Hyde did not expect that our operations were 
dangerous to hiln. On the other hand, our foreuran and 
both ~Ir. Reed and ~Jr. Gibbons testified that their 
operations \Yere in accordance with established practice, 
and that we were using the shovel for the very purpose 
for which it had been invented. 
Point 7 states that we had owned and operated 
other gravel pits and are farniliar with other and nor1nal 
procedures. That is true, and it is like·wise true that 
this pit was operated in a norn1almanner. 
There is no point to either nurnber 8 and 9 since 
there is no evidence whatever that any other of our 
operators or engineers would have worked the pit in 
any different way than it was worked. In fact, the 
contrary appears, because both :Mr. Gibbons and :Mr. 
Reed are experienced operators and engineers and the 
pit was operated as it was with their full knowledge 
and approval. 
The plaintiff stated in point 10 that we \Yere warned 
by ~Ir. Hyde that the operation was dangerous. \V e 
have already shown that all :Mr. Hyde was afraid of 
was for the safety of the men actually working in the 
blasting and in the removal of the material. He never 
warned us that there was any possible danger of the 
:-:lide that actually occurred, nor did anyone el'se, nor is 
there a word of evidence that any such slide has ever 
occurred before in this area. 
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There is no point to nmnber 11 because it was con-
ceded that there was a danger to the rnen working from 
the sloughing off of n1aterial frmn the face of the cliff. 
That is not the kind of danger that plaintiff is com-
plaining of in this case. 
On point 12, there is not a word of evidence that 
rnen frorn a commercial operation refused to blast at 
this pit. The most that can be gained from that evidence 
is that two rnen came out and left; that they were hard-
rock rniners and didn't care to work in gravel, pre-
sumably because they knew nothing about blasting in 
gravel. 
On point 13 there is not one witness who testified 
that this slide reasonably could be anticipated. Nothing 
of the kind was foreseen by anyone or could be forseen 
by anyone because such a thing has never before occurred 
in this area. 
N" ot one of the 13 points shows an:, duty that we 
owed the plaintiff. There is nothing in this case that 
required us to operate our pit to suit either l\lr. lly(h··~ 
ideas or the plaintiff's. On the other hand, it appt>nr~ 
from both the testirnony of Mr. Hyde and from thP 
plaintiff himself that if there was any danger both of 
thenr knew of it and were far rnore apprehensive than 
\\'Hl-l the defendant, yet their apprehensions did not 
lead them to protect their property eitltPr because they 
thought their property \\·a~ in no dang-er and if they 
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thought that to be the fact we cannot be charged with 
anticipating· ~omething neither of then1 anticipated, or 
in spite of the danger which was nwre apparent to thern 
than to us they deliberately and of their own accord 
left their property where it could be injured. In either 
event there can be no recovery either by .Mr. Hyde or 
the plaintiff since we owed no duty to them and if we 
did, they had knowledge equal or superior to ours and 
did not act to protect th,~Inselve~, or else they felt that 
our operations were not dangerous to their property. 
rnder any one of the propositions there can be no 
recovery by the plaintiff. 
Plaintiff has cited many cases with which we have 
no quarrel. Actually they have no application, although 
several of the1n do announce well-established principals 
of law which absolutely bar the plaintiff from recovery 
in thi's case. 
The cases and the texts discuss proxim,ate cause, 
foreseeability, negligence ttnd other well-established 
principle~. There is not one case cited, and we have 
found none, where the event that caused the injury was 
of the kind with which we are concerned here. It is 
true that the rule is quite uniform that the foresee-
ability rule in determining proximate cause does not 
require the negligent person to forsee the injury in the 
precise fonn in which it occurred or to anticipate the 
particular consequences actually caused from his act or 
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ommission. However, it is likewise true that in all 
jurisdictions in detennining proximate cause the law 
does not charge a person with all possible consequences 
of his negligent act. 
"He is not responsible for a consequence 
which is 1nerely possible, according to occassional 
experience, but only for a consequence which is 
probable, accordin~ to ordinary and usual experi-
ence. It has been said that the natural and 
probable consequences are those which human 
foresight can anticipate because they happen so 
frequently that they may be expected to happen 
again, and that the possible consequences are 
those which happen so infrequently that they 
are not expected to happen again. Negligence 
carries with it liability for consequences which, 
in the light of attendant circu~nstances, could 
reasonably have been anticipated by a prudent 
nmn, but not for casualties which, although possi-
ble, were wholly improbable." 38 Am J11r, par Gl, 
page 712, (supra). 
Of course, all the authorities eited assume that the 
defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff. In Co1·e rs. 
Tho m psou_. 25-t P. 2d 1 0-l-7, cited hy plain tiff at pagt> :r). 
this court affirmed a directed verdiet lwc-a u~<' of the 
decea~ed~~ contributor~· negligence. The ('ourt al~o di~­
cussed the last clear chance rule, \Yith which we ar<' not 
eoncerned in this case. 
Stonp rs. Railroad, 32 Utah 20;), S9 J>. 7:2:.!, <'Olll-
mences at page 715 of the Pacific Report~. and the 
llUotation given hy the plaintiff i~ completed h~· the fol-
lowing ,,·hich when applied to plaintiff har~ hi~ rP<·on•ry: 
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··If the act is one \Vhich the party, in the 
exerei::'e of ordinary care, could have anticipated 
as likely to result in injury, then he is liable for 
any injury actually resulting fr01n it, although he 
could not haYe anticipated the particular injury 
which did occur." 
The eYidence in the case at bar is all to the effect that 
no reasonable person could have anticipated the slide 
that injured the plaintiff's shovel. The plaintiff how-
PYer, clain1s that he was apprehensive for his shovel 
working in clo::'e proximity to the bank He was not so 
apprehensive that he took any ~teps to rernove it from 
the pit, clearly indicating either that he didn't care or 
that he didn't think it was in any particular danger. 
The next case cited by the plaintiff is Mountain 
States Tel & Tel. Co., vs. Consolidated Freightways, 242 
P. ~d 563 (cited in plaintiff's index as 232 P. 2d). That 
('a~e merely applies the test of foreseeability, which as 
\H' have already pointed out has no application here 
:-:ince no one could forsee or did forsee that the entire 
mountain would slip away or that there was any danger 
to anyone except as might be caused by sloughing 
material and rocks. 
The texts cited by plaintiff are merely repetitious 
of the principles announced in the cases. This is particu-
larly true of the annotation 155 A. L. R. 157. 
In the C'ase of Coray vs. Southern Pacific, 112 lTtah 
1 G6, lS;) P. :2d 963, this court made several interesting 
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observations particularly applicable ~1ere and which in 
our judgment point up both the lack of a cau~e of action 
and also the plaintiff's equal responsibility if there wa~ 
any responsibility. At page 968 of the Pacific Report:'. 
this court stated in par. 12: 
··Jurors sitting as triers of the fact are not 
empowered to decide legal questions, nor draw 
an)~ conclusions of law therefron1 except a~ guided 
bv the instructions of the court. If there i~ no 
dispute as to the facts, there is no occasion to 
instruct the jury, for the jurors have no conflict 
in evidence to detern1ine, and no ultimate fact:' 
to find." 
In our case as we have already pointed out the 
plaintiff hi1nself brought out all the facts with reference 
to his knowledge, his fears, his apprehensions and what 
he did. rrhere \YHS no burden upon US to prove this and 
it was undisputed. There was nothing for the jury to 
decide. Nor i::-~ it disputed that we owned the land and 
that the plaintiff's shovel was present on ~aid land at 
the plaintiff's own ri~l~. This court abo ~aid (par. 1-l-) 
in that case: 
"The 'cause' must, of course, he the legal 
cause, in order to be the basis of recovery. To 
show merely that the injury would not Ita,.,. 
occurred had there been no violation of the ad, 
i~ not the equivalent of showing that the ,·iol<~­
tion was the eause thereof. 'In order to lw t]w 
legal eause of another's harm, it is not PllOil.! .. di 
that the harm would not han• occurn·d had thP 
actor not heen negligent • • •. The tH'.! . dig·pJH·p 
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must also be a substantial factor as \veil as an 
actual factor in bringing about the pl'aintiff's 
harnr. The word 'substantial' is used to denote 
the fact that the defendant's conduct has such an 
effeet in producing the harnr as to lead reasonable 
men to regard it as a cause, using that word in 
the popular sense in which there always lurks 
the idea of responsibility, rather than in the so-
called 'philosophic sense,' which includes every 
one of the great nurnber of eYents without which 
any happening would not have occurred. Each 
of these events is a cause in the so-called 'philo-
sophic sense,' yet the effect of many of them is 
so insignificant that no ordinary mind would 
think of them as causes.'" 
On page 969 this court said : 
·'So in the instant case the question of lra-
bility may be considered as a question of whether 
there was any breach of duty on the part of the 
railroad to plaintiff's intestate, rather than a 
question of proximate cause." 
That is exactly the question here. There \vas no 
breach of duty in the case at bar owed by the defendant 
to the plaintiff and the court so found as did this court 
in the Coray case. 
On the question of plaintiff's contributory negli-
genee plaintiff, of course, is understandably vague. He 
~tate~ at page 38 of his brief: 
"Under the tension and strain of cross exru:ni-
nation as to why he did not personally rernove the 
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shovel instead of attempting to locate Newman, 
he testified that he had his good clothes on and 
didn't want to leave his car in danger." 
This is not the entire extent of the plaintiff's con-
duct as we have already pointed out and to which we 
shall n1ake no further reference. 
The case of Clay v. Dunford, 239 P. 2d 1075, cited 
by plaintiff at page 39, discusses assumption of risk a~ 
compared to contributory negligence and states that 
(p. 1076); 
"The essential elements of assu1ned risk are 
knowledge, actual or implied, by the plaintiff of 
a SJJecific defect or dangerous condition caused 
by the negligence of the defendant in the viola-
tion of some duty owing to the plaintiff, * * * 
together with the plaintiff''s appreciation of the 
danger to be encountered and his voluntary 
exposure of himself to it." 
Page 1077 of the Pacific Reporter also states: 
"It has been said that 'knowledge of the ri~k 
is the watchword of * * * a8~umption of risk'." 
In our case there is lacking also the Yiolation of a 
duty owed plaintiff h)· us. 
The case of Gibbs vs. Bl11e Cab, ~-t-9 P. :2d 21:~, cited 
by plaintiff at page 40, statE's as is the general rule that 
each case dPpPnrl~ on its own faeb, with which we agrPP. 
There is no case cited hy plaintiff, nor have wt> 
found one a~:-:erting- that a propert~· owner u~mg hi:-
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own property for the very purposes for which it is 
valuable is bound to protect a person on said property 
for his own benefit, \Yith full knowledge of everything 
being done and of all the facts and circumstances sur-
rounding the activity, frmn the results of an event that 
was not and could not be foreseen by anyone present at 
the operation. 
The case of Stickle vs. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 
:251 P. ~()/, cited at page 41 of plaintiff's hrief does not 
add anything to the discussion. This court said at page 
~10 of the Pacific Reporte1·, par. 7 and 8: 
.. It should be kept in n1ind that so far as the 
quanttun of proof necessary to take the question 
of contributory negligence frorn the jury is con-
cerned, the tests are the sarne as with respect to 
primary negligence." 
Ln the case at bar there is no conflict in the evidence 
regarding plaintiff's conduct. It cmne from the plain-
tiff'~ own lips. He, of all those present, was the only one 
who clairned that there was any danger to his shovel. 
He did nothing about it. He could have done something 
about it. He voluntarily elected to do nothing, either 
because he didn't think there was any pressing danger 
to the shovel or else because he \Yas heedless of its 
safety. There \vas nothing to he decided by the jury with 
reference to plaintiff's conduct, nor was there anything 
to be decided by the jury with reference to our duty so 
far a~ thc> plaintiff was concerned. 
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The very reason that our rules have been drafted 
as they are to per1nit courts to give judg1nent notwith-
standing jury verdicts is a long recognized necessity of 
protecting litigants from unwarranted, unauthorized and 
illegal jury verdicts. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court was right in giving judgment to 
the defendant. In the use and operation of its property 
it owed no duty to the plaintiff; it was guilty of no acts 
or omissions for which it could be held liable for negli-
gence. It was also wrong to submit the case to the 
jury because the plaintiff's own testimony establishes 
that he both assumed the risk and that his own conduct 
wm; the proxinmte cause of his dmnage. If there wa:-~ 
negligence in this case it was the negligence of the 
plaintiff ·which bars his recovery. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SHIRLEY P. JONES, 
SHIRLEY P. JONES, JR. 
Attorneys for Defendnat 
411 Utah Oil Building 
~alt Lake City 1, Utah 
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